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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 10/80)



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BOOK EXCERPTS: PARTY COMMISSIONS IN ARMED FORCES

Moscow PARTIYNYYE KOMISSII PRI POLITORGANAKH ARMII I FLOTA in Russian 1979
pp 1, 2, 3-22, 151-160, 161-181, 182-183

[Book compiled by Maj Gen A. Z. Shcheglakov]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: PARTIYNYYE KOMISSII PRI POLITORGANAKH ARMII I FLOTA
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Annotation

This book describes party commission experience in mobilizing Army and Navy communists to successfully perform the tasks set for the Soviet Armed Forces by the CPSU, and the forms and methods used by political organs to direct them. The authors analyze the organizational and the ideological-indoctrinational work of political organs, party commissions, primary party and Komsomol organizations. The book also contains the answers to certain questions on party work.

The book was written for the party and Komsomol aktiv of the Army and Navy.

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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK--GOOD QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

[Chapter by Army Gen. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy]

The Soviet people have entered the seventh decade in the glorious history of the Soviet state filled with strength and optimism. A climate of political activity reigns in the nation, a climate created by the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of the Soviet Armed Forces, by the newly ratified Constitution of the USSR and by decisions coming out of the December 1977 and the July and November 1978 plenums of the Party Central Committee. Fulfilling the historic plans produced at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, urban and rural workers are attempting to successfully complete the tasks specified in the 10th Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet nation's Armed Forces, who have celebrated their glorious 61st anniversary, are proceeding in single formation with the entire Soviet people. This national holiday represented a review of the heroic deeds and feats of the defenders of the homeland of October, who have demonstrated their selfless loyalty to the socialist homeland and constant readiness to defend socialism's revolutionary conquests. From the pinnacle of the six decades during which our army has vigilantly stood its combat watch, all of us see with special clarity the brilliant perspicacity of V. I. Lenin's statement to the effect that any revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend itself.

In the contemporary situation, the party continues to be guided by Leninist principles on defending the people's revolutionary conquests. Directing the building of communism in our nation, it thoroughly analyzes the realities which have developed in the international arena and takes into thorough account the world situation and the military preparations of reactionary forces. Faced by the military threat emerging from the imperialists, the Soviet state is forced to improve its defenses. The Greeting from the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to fighting men of the valorous Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, which was read by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at a formal meeting in honor of the glorious anniversary of the Army and Navy, laid emphasis upon the following: "The essence of our military policy is everything for an effective defense, nothing more. The Soviet Union has never armed for the sake of armament and never has and never will be the instigator of an arms race. Everything which the Soviet people are doing in the military area is done to make ourselves and our socialist friends secure from attack, to prevent aggression. And today, we have reason to be proud of what we have achieved in this respect."

Thanks to the concern demonstrated by the party and to the selfless labor of the people, our Armed Forces now have everything necessary reliably to defend the creative labor of the builders of communism. Patriotic duty prompts the fighting men to master military affairs well, to learn the combat equipment and weapons to perfection and to remain constantly at a

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high level of combat readiness, a level insuring an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. The advice, recommendations and instructions given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in speeches to the workers and the defenders of our borders in the Far East during a trip to areas of Siberia and the Far East, and in his speeches at the 23rd Komsomol Congress and a formal meeting in Minsk, were received by the personnel as a mandate from the Party and the people to continue reliably defending the revolutionary conquests of socialism.

Successful resolution of the complex group of problems involved in maintaining the Army and Navy at the proper level of combat readiness is achieved by strictly observing the Leninist principles underlying party leadership of the Armed Forces. This refers to unity of political and military leadership, theoretical and practical unity in the work of military cadres, augmentation of the Party's influence upon all aspects of Army and Navy life, maintaining close ties with the masses of fighting men and relying upon their experience in military organizational development.

The Leninist principles underlying leadership of the Armed Forces are creatively developed in the work of the USSR Defense Council headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Military cadres are constantly aware of the firm leadership exercised by the Party Central Committee and of its concern for strengthening the national defense, which is accomplished to a decisive degree by maintaining the Army and Navy at a level which meets the demands of today.

Lenin's Party directs commanders, political organs and party organizations to do everything possible to see that all steps taken to build up the combat capability of the Army and Navy are based on precise fulfillment of the requirements set by the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet government and the USSR Minister of Defense. Further improvement of the work performed by military cadres in this area calls for increasing the effectiveness of decisions made on matters of combat readiness and combat and political training, and extending the Party's influence upon the life of the troops and the fleets.

Combining the functions of political leader, organizer and indoctrinator of the masses in its work, the Party links the development of theoretical principles in the area of Soviet military organizational development with their realization. It provides cadres with the tools of Leninist methodology for understanding and resolving problems of protecting socialism's conquests and teaches them to analyze the aggregate of developments characterizing the balance of class forces in the world, the interrelationship between war and the era and the interdependence of factors insuring victory in a modern war.

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As it develops revolutionary theory, the CPSU devotes a great deal of attention to analyzing problems of war and peace and to the creation of foreign political conditions conducive to the building of communism in our nation. The Party's conclusions on the need to build up the Soviet Union's defense capability and to increase the combat strength of the Army and Navy, which were contained in anniversary materials devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the glorious anniversary of the Armed Forces, are of real importance to us. The chapter on defending the socialist homeland, which was included in the Constitution of the USSR for the first time, is filled with enormous theoretical and political meaning. A profound understanding on the part of all fighting men of the tasks set by the Party for strengthening the national defense and of the constitutional requirements defining the duty of the Armed Forces to the people are now the most important characteristic of awareness and of a good state of combat morale on the part of the fighting men.

The level of effectiveness of the Party's leadership of the Armed Forces is reflected in the flexible selection of military organizational forms and in the anticipation of the nature of a possible war and methods of conducting it. The CPSU teaches us to take a creative approach in defining the most correct ways of preparing the Army and Navy and of training and indoctrinating the personnel, relating them closely to the situation as it develops.

Theoretical principles, like past experience, cannot always provide the answers to questions advanced by life and by the practical military work. We must seek new forms and methods for the combat training and indoctrination of the personnel. In the contemporary situation, creativity and innovation are becoming the pattern of thought, the standard for the daily work of commanders and political workers and the leaders of Party and Komsomol organizations, who implement Party policy. A scientific and creative approach contributes to the development of common views on troop training tasks and to the improvement of the material and spiritual constituents of the army's fighting strength.

Improvement of the Army and Navy's fighting power and of their combat readiness is determined to a crucial degree by the level of party-political work, which comprises the most important area of the multifaceted work performed by the CPSU in directing the Armed Forces. "Party-political work with the personnel and their ideological conditioning," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has noted, "have always been and remain a powerful weapon of our Army. The power of this weapon has been tested in the heat of battle. It frightens our enemies even now."²

Party-political work is the scientifically-based ideological and organizational work performed by military councils, commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations, by all communists in the Army and Navy to implement the Leninist Party's policy in the Armed Forces, to

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indoctrinate the fighting men in the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to mobilize them to perform their sacred duty in an exemplary manner. It embraces an extremely broad range of issues pertaining to all aspects of the training and service of the personnel and to their moral-political and psychological preparedness to defend the homeland and the entire socialist commonwealth. Party-political work, as Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, pointed out in his report "Sixty Years Guarding the Conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution," "is a special kind of weapon. It never becomes obsolete."³

The substance and the main focuses of party-political work in the Army and Navy are determined today by the tasks put forth and performed by the Party to improve the Armed Forces and by the peculiarities of the domestic and international situations, as well as by the specific conditions in which the troops live and perform. Commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations, all the fighting men, are now concentrating mainly upon studying and implementing decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress, the principles and conclusions set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress and in his works and speeches, and the requirements contained in the new Constitution of the USSR. L. I. Brezhnev's memoirs "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth] and "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands] constitute a powerful means of intensifying the ideological conditioning of the personnel. They teach us to live and work in a Leninist manner and instill good party principle and loyalty to the heroic traditions of the Soviet people.

Effectiveness in party-political work is characterized by how completely it takes into account the peculiarities of the contemporary stage in the development of our Armed Forces. At least four such specific features can be identified.

In the first place, the building of developed socialism and the transition of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of all the people have produced considerable changes in the social essence and the character of the Armed Forces. Their common-societal nature has become firmly established, and their internal function has come to an end.

The external function of the Army and Navy has expanded and gained new substance. The tasks involved in strengthening the Armed Forces are now determined exclusively by the existence of imperialism and by the military danger emerging from it. The Constitution of the USSR stresses the fact that our Armed Forces are intended for protecting the socialist conquests and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

The social and political foundations for the nation's defense capability have become even stronger under developed socialism. The high level of maturity of public relations, the equalization of classes and social groups,

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the increasing friendship among the peoples of the USSR and the entrenchment of communist ideology and socialist patriotism and internationalism in the masses, all these processes which have developed in our society have directly affected the strengthening of the state's defense strength. They are producing internal solidarity and unity among personnel of the Armed Forces and comradely mutual relations among the servicemen and among command personnel and the rank and file.

Improved social and political relations have in recent years produced a further strengthening of the social base for providing the personnel for the Armed Forces. This has resulted to a considerable degree from the systematic growth of the working class, the increased portion of machinery specialists among kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers, and other processes occurring in the nation's social development. Right now, almost two-thirds of the fighting men in the Army and Navy are members of the working class, who embody the best social and ideological and moral qualities of the people. The kolkhoz youth entering the forces are making considerable progress in the political, cultural and technological respects. The number of members of the intelligentsia is growing. The fact that the different classes and social groups making up the Soviet society have moved toward equality is increasing the social uniformity of personnel in the Army and Navy and their moral-political solidarity, which is benefiting the combat readiness of the troops.

The common-societal makeup of our army is demonstrated by the fact that representatives of more than 100 of the nation's nationalities and ethnic groups serve in its ranks. Unlike the multinational makeup of the bourgeois armies, socialist multinationality strengthens and unifies the military teams. The whole system of training and indoctrinational work performed in the units and on the ships and the organization of the army life of the multinational military teams are subordinated to indoctrination of the servicemen in a spirit of military comradeship and fraternal friendship among peoples. The joint military work brings the fighting men together and contributes to mutual ideological, intellectual and cultural enrichment.

As a result of the adoption of universal secondary education and the fulfillment of decisions adopted by the CPSU in the areas of higher, secondary and vocational and technical education, the Armed Forces are receiving youth with a higher level of ideological and political conditioning and intellectual and physical development. Practically all the youth joining the Army and Navy today have a partial or complete secondary or a higher education. As a rule, every third draftee has a specialty acquired in a DOSAAF training organization.

The Leninist principles underlying the popular nature of the Armed Forces of the USSR and unity of the army and people are embodied in the constantly strengthening ties between the personnel and urban and rural workers, scientists, cultural workers and artists, the student youth and

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war veterans. Soviet fighting men are active in the nation's social and political life and help perform important national economic tasks, without detriment to the work of strengthening the nation's defense.

In the second place, the increased indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces is taken into account in party-political work. As they serve, the fighting men develop the qualities of a social builder and a skilled defender of the new society. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the youth join the military family without schooling in life. They return from the army as graduates of the school of perseverance and discipline, with technical and vocational skills and political preparation."⁴

Everything possible is done in the Army and Navy to see that the years spent by the youth in the military ranks provide them with a real school of ideological and political indoctrination, courage and good moral qualities. Strict regulation order, observance of the fighting men's legal rights and satisfaction of their spiritual and personal needs and requirements increase the indoctrinational effect of the entire structure of army life upon them. Commanders, political organs, Army and Navy communists strive to utilize the enhanced material possibilities to improve the everyday life of the personnel, to see that the military barracks is a good place in which to live, to think, to rest and relax. Upon returning to their labor collectives, fighting men released into the reserve set examples of good citizenship and organization and a conscientious attitude toward their assigned job.

A third characteristic of Soviet military organizational development lies in the fact that our Armed Forces are developed as an inseparable part of the combat fraternity of armies of the Warsaw Pact nations. Socialism's collective defense is a common pattern in the building of socialism and an important international task, a task performed through the joint efforts of the fraternal armies. There is close cooperation in the perfection of their military skill and in the training of the fighter-internationalists who serve to the motto: "Class Brothers--Brothers In Arms." They are joined by a oneness of political, economic, ideological and strategic military principles. The fraternal armies are outfitted with modern weapons, have generally the same type of organization and regularly exchange combat, operational and political training know-how.

In the fourth place, the role of the Soviet Armed Forces as a bulwark of universal peace, as a factor restraining the aggressive endeavors of the most reactionary circles among the imperialist powers, has increased today. Our foreign friends, honest people throughout the earth, can see the true goal of the bourgeois propagandists, who are attempting to conceal the anti-popular nature of the imperialist armies and attempting to distort the historical mission of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

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Contrary to the slanderous assertions made by bourgeois propaganda, the Soviet Union will never take the path of aggression. It will never take up the sword against other peoples. The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces restrains the imperialists from unleashing a war, from initiating new military conflicts.

As the military councils, the commanders and political organs perform the tasks assigned them under the Party's leadership, they are expected to utilize in the ideological and organizational work among the fighting men those superiorities which the society of developed socialism possesses, the common-societal nature of the Soviet state, its military organization. The combat capability of units and ships and the constant combat readiness of the personnel depend in great part upon the style of their work, upon how consistently and strictly they implement Leninist principles of party leadership of the Armed Forces. The 25th CPSU Congress set great demands for the modern leader, who must organically combine party mindedness and thorough competence, discipline and the ability to rely upon the collective and to indoctrinate the men.

The CPSU strives to see that party-political work is constantly enriched with new substance, forms and methods, which correspond most completely to the specific situation and to the tasks being performed by the Army and Navy. On this level, we might mention the basic features characterizing the ideological and organizational work of today's commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations.

First of all, these include inseparable linkage of party-political work with the common party and state tasks. In the contemporary situation, it is performed with the Party performing a growing leadership role in military organizational development, a fact reflected in the thorough development of questions of military policy, in the scientific determination of the most important trends in the development of the Armed Forces and in the organization of the party-political work performed with the personnel. The Party's Central Committee provides us with precise guidelines and makes political work in the Army and Navy goal-oriented and effective.

In recent years, the scientific approach has been more extensively adopted at all levels of Party development in the Armed Forces. Processes and phenomena occurring in the forces are being more thoroughly analyzed. New trends, patterns of development and qualitative changes occurring in the personnel, weaponry and methods of conducting combat operations are being taken more thoroughly into account. In light of decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress, many current issues of Party development have been worked out more thoroughly in the materials of scientific and practical conferences of leading political workers of the Army and Navy, as well as at theoretical conferences conducted in the anniversary year in the districts, groups of forces and fleets.

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Party-political work has become more effective and its influence upon the qualitative performance of tasks required by combat readiness has been expanded considerably as a result of the increased demands set by the CPSU Central Committee. Political organs and Party organizations are utilizing their intrinsic work forms and methods to interrelate their work more purposefully with the basic problems involved in training the forces and fleets. Considerable experience in party-political work was acquired in the Ground Forces, for example, in the process of bringing them to a state of combat readiness and performing long marches. There has been a marked increase in the amount of attention given to the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the personnel.

The work practices of political organs and Party organizations in the Strategic Missile Forces have been enriched, especially the work performed with personnel standing combat watch. Its effectiveness is graphically demonstrated in the stability and high level of readiness of the combat teams, in the good performance of periodic technical servicing and the maintenance of the missiles in a state of readiness for immediate combat employment.

Party-political work performed in the National Air Defense Forces to insure that the personnel standing combat watch and all of the complexes and control systems are at a high level of combat readiness has become more effective and purposive. Party influence upon the performance of tasks involved in mastering the new equipment and improving the air training of the personnel has increased in the Air Forces. Political work performed in the fleets themselves, on long naval cruises, has been stepped up in the Navy.

In accordance with directions issued by the 25th CPSU Congress, the effectiveness of party-political work performed to maintain the troops and naval forces in a constant state of combat readiness has become an extremely important criterion by which we evaluate the multifaceted work of political organs and Party organizations. The main efforts are focused upon developing in the servicemen a scientific outlook, the moral-political and psychological qualities necessary to achieve victory in modern combat, and political awareness as an extremely important factor in the struggle for a high level of combat training.

There is probably no issue involved in Army and Navy life, the resolution of which does not require further improvement of party-political work, whether it pertain to indoctrinating the fighting men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, insuring a high level of combat readiness, motivating the personnel to master the weapons in an exemplary manner or strengthening the sole-command principle and military discipline. Commanders and political workers are expected to follow in all matters the instruction of V. I. Lenin, who emphasized that the nation's defense preparation requires not a single outpouring of effort but "lengthy, intense, extremely determined and disciplined work on a mass scale."⁵

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The Party line of improving quality and effectiveness in all areas of the public work also fully determines the nature of the work performed by political organs and Party organizations in the Armed Forces. The results of the combat and political training demonstrate the successful fulfillment of 1978 training plans and programs and the realistic nature of the socialist commitments accepted in honor of the anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. The Party's appeal to work better today than yesterday and better tomorrow than today is also finding concrete embodiment in the life of the Army and Navy.

During the past training year, fighting men of the Army and Navy achieved new successes in the combat and political training. The field, air and naval training of the personnel of units and ships improved, and numerous practice missile launchings, bombings and artillery and torpedo firings were skillfully performed. The rank of initiators of socialist competition was held high by excellent units in the different services of the Armed Forces, which set an example of selflessness in the training, of purpose and persistence, for all.

Commanders, political workers and Party organizations see their main task as one of making the training and indoctrination more effective, making efficient use of training time and fulfilling combat and political training plans on a high level. The ability to mobilize the personnel to fully complete training plans and socialist commitments is now regarded as one of the most important indicators of maturity on the part of commanders and political workers and of aggressive action on the part of Party organizations.

Political organs and Party organizations are increasingly concentrating their attention upon specific types of combat training and tactical, fire and special training tasks and are exerting a more competent influence at the ranges, airfields and training centers. There is a great deal to be learned in the work performed to master the combat equipment and weapons. The skillful employment of tools for actively influencing the mastery of combat equipment by the personnel, such as assistance in the creation of a modern training base and the development of efficiency and inventions work and military-technical propaganda, has a positive influence upon the effectiveness of party-political work.

Life moves forward, however, and creates new demands. What was considered an achievement yesterday can no longer satisfy us today. It seems that we must extend and improve the differentiated approach to each category of servicemen and give maximum consideration to the specific tasks involved in their combat and special training.

It is impossible not to notice the fact that in some units there is a certain gap between the generally correct and substantive measures conducted on the unit scale and the work performed in the subunits themselves,

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where, strictly speaking, the foundation is laid for the combat readiness and solidarity of the military teams. Improving the level of indoctrinational measures in the company and battalion is one of those reserves which make it possible for commanders and political organs to make the combat training more effective and to strengthen military discipline.

A struggle for effectiveness and quality requires the ability to encourage and disseminate truly effective and beneficial initiatives, to eliminate everything hampering innovation. On this level, it is extremely important to further increase the effectiveness of socialist competition and make more practical use of the competition as a powerful means of developing social activeness in the men.

The organization and direction of competition calls for a constant search for forms, methods and techniques of stimulating creative initiative in the fighting men, which are most appropriate to the given moment and to the nature of the tasks being performed by the unit and subunit and to the specific characteristics of the personnel. Ostentation, loud publicity and commitments not backed up with practical deeds and real achievements are alien to it.

The further strengthening of military discipline is one of the issues requiring the constant attention of commanders and political organs. The present state of discipline makes it possible for the fighting men to perform their combat watch in an exemplary manner, of course, but this in no way gives us the right to forget that there are still deficiencies in this area.

Some commanders, political organs and staffs are still dealing with problems of discipline without any sort of system, spasmodically, mainly after a violation has been committed. Undesirable effects are resulting from the inability of certain comrades to analyze the full complexity and the multifaceted nature of a problem related to a human being, to his awareness, morality and psychology, and the changes taking place in the personnel. The steps taken in this area are frequently limited to meetings, conferences, inspections and the recording of deficiencies, and as a rule, this does not always alter anything in the life of the units or help the matter to the proper extent.

I believe that advances in the further strengthening of discipline will soon be evident if all the commanders and political workers will improve organization and order at all levels and the individual indoctrinational work performed with subordinates, be thoroughly aware of the situation in the barracks, see that the honor and dignity of the servicemen are respected and that their requests are satisfied, and take prompt action in the case of unwholesome attitudes. We need to be stricter in imposing service and Party penalties upon those who conceal violations of military discipline, thereby themselves hindering the creation of a moral atmosphere which contributes to the development of an individual spiritually rich and morally mature.

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One important way to strengthen military discipline lies in strictly adhering to the Leninist principle of single-command and raising the commander's prestige. Maintaining the prestige of this or that officer, naturally, does not depend entirely upon the political organs or the military community. Most important are his own activities, his personal conduct and the example he sets in the observance of Soviet laws, military regulations and communist moral standards. When an officer violates these, conducts himself in an unworthy manner and commits violations, he loses the moral prestige of a leader. We must be extremely demanding and strict with such commanders and political workers.

Intensifying Party influence upon all aspects of Army and Navy life and upon the training and indoctrination of the personnel means making active and complete use of the abundance of means and methods of ideological work in the interest of building up moral strength. Extensive and regular explanation of CPSU policy and theoretical interpretation of our practical deeds effectively contribute to the indoctrination of ideologically mature fighting men thoroughly aware of their sacred duty to defend the homeland and the conquests of socialism. There are great possibilities for the development of good combat morale in the troops in the thorough study of 25th Party Congress materials, the reports and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Constitution of the USSR, which is conducted throughout the system of political training for the personnel. Political organs and Party organizations have begun devoting greater attention to the substance of ideological measures, to the thorough clarification of current problems of Party theory and policy and to linking the material studied to the life of the nation and the Armed Forces.

A certain amount of positive experience has accumulated in the Army and Navy in the comprehensive organization of indoctrination, in which propaganda, agitation and the reality and the social milieu surrounding the fighting man all contribute to the development of the individual and help to increase his political awareness and moral maturity. The task of improving ideological work remains urgent, however.

In the Army and Navy collectives one still encounters violations of discipline, our society's moral standards of life and the requirements contained in regulations and the oath, that is, events indicating poor indoctrinational work in certain units and subunits. And one of the causes of this situation lies in the fact that some political organs do a superficial job of analyzing the complex system by which knowledge is converted into the convictions of the men and motivations for their conduct, into their deeds and actions, structure ideological and political indoctrination in a general manner, do not react promptly and effectively to daily events and give inadequate consideration to scientific recommendations on ways to develop a high level of political awareness in their practical work.

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When the Party stresses the need to make ideological work more effective, it is also referring to a stepped up ideological struggle in the world. Attempting to slow the victorious advance of socialist concepts, imperialist reaction is intensifying its dissemination of bourgeois views and various types of antiscientific "theories." Its stress is on ideological warfare, demagoguery, misinformation and the distortion of such basic Marxist-Leninist principles as the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist democracy and proletarian internationalism.

Attempts by bourgeois sociologists and Maoists to revise scientific views on the nature, the causes and the sources of wars in the modern era and key aspects of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army should also be considered in the overall context of the contemporary ideological struggle. An attack is being made in this manner upon the world perspectives underlying the policy of the CPSU and fraternal communist parties in the area of protecting the conquests of socialism.

Tempering the fighting men in a spirit of communist ideals and developing intolerance for bourgeois and revisionist ideology in the people form the crucial prerequisite for successfully counteracting ideas and views alien to us. The task is one of seeing to it that every serviceman thoroughly understands the course of world development and its prospects, correctly analyzes events occurring in the nation and internationally, from class standpoints, and consciously performs his constitutional duty with respect to providing armed protection of the Soviet homeland.

Party commissions of the Army and Navy have a large role in the accomplishment of the complex tasks involved in making party-political work more effective. Positioned at the forward edge of the struggle to increase Party influence upon all aspects of Army and Navy life, they are making an important contribution to the improvement of the organizational and ideological work of Party organizations and to the strengthening of Party and state discipline and are doing a great deal to increase the demandingness applied to commanders and political workers, to all communists of the units and ships, for the implementation of Party decisions with respect to strengthening the national defense.

An analysis of the more important focuses of Party commission work should place the primary emphasis upon demonstrating constant concern for improving the qualitative makeup of those becoming CPSU members or candidate members. Party commissions, of course, are charged with the function of considering Party organization decisions on questions relating to acceptance into the Party. The strict performance of this function makes it possible to fill CPSU ranks with fresh forces from among those servicemen who have earned the recognition of the entire team by handling their military duty in an exemplary manner.

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We give due credit to the Party commissions for the fact that political organs have increased their control with respect to fighting men preparing for Party membership. Their decisions in these matters are based primarily upon the need to step up Party influence in the subunits, where the tasks directly affecting combat readiness are performed. Last year, almost four-fifths of the new CPSU members were serving in line units or on ships. Party organizations are becoming especially strong in the services of the Armed Forces and troop arms, which are becoming increasingly important in the overall national defense system. This includes the missile forces, the air forces, the antiaircraft missile troops and the nuclear-powered submarines. The majority of subunits now have Party organizations or groups. This is the force which binds our military collectives.

Constant replenishment of the CPSU ranks is required in order to increase the leading role of the CPSU as the guiding force in Soviet society and as the foundation underlying Soviet military organizational development. The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the fact, however, that the Party does not force its numerical growth. It accepts only those who have actually demonstrated that they are entering the Party, in Lenin's words, not for the sake of any advantages but to work selflessly for the benefit of communism.⁶

It is not a simple matter, of course, to control the growth of Party ranks, especially under our Army and Navy conditions. We must not accomplish this by accelerating the acceptance of certain categories of servicemen into the Party. Furthermore, there are still subunits which have no Party organizations or groups. The proper approach to this problem should obviously consist in seeing to it that every political organ and every Party organization, relying upon common Party requirements, take into full account the specific characteristics of the unit and formation and the need to intensify Party influence at the crucial levels, in the areas which are the key to combat readiness.

As we implement the principles formulated at the 25th CPSU Congress, we should persistently increase the responsibility of primary Party organizations, Party groups and commissions, of all the communists, for the quality of Party replenishment and for strict adherence to the principle of selecting CPSU members on an individual basis. This was underscored once more in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of Accepting Party Members and Indoctrinating Candidate Members of the CPSU by Kirgiziya's Party Organizations." The fulfillment of requirements set forth in this decree requires further improvement of the work of Party organizations, political organs and Party commissions.

The range of work performed by Party commissions has expanded perceptibly in recent years. In accordance with the Statute on Political Organs, they are actively checking on the observance of the CPSU Charter, Party, state and military discipline on the part of Party members and candidate members.

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In all their work, the Party commissions are striving to increase the responsibility of the communists for the implementation of Party policy.

Party commission participation in the work of groups of political organs studying various questions of intraparty life has become broader and more diversified. This is becoming normal procedure in the work of many Party commissions. We could benefit by studying the performance of Party commissions under the political directorates of the Belorussian, Turkestan, Moscow and Carpathian military districts, the Moscow Air Defense District, the Northern Fleet, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and a number of the large Air Force units.

An analysis of the combat and political training is revealing isolated cases of nonobjective evaluation of the competition results, lack of discipline and deficiencies in the performance of service duties by individual communists in the work of unit and ship Party organizations. Party commission members have the opportunity to work more actively to prevent discipline violations and to increase the indoctrinational effect of their decisions.

Guided by Lenin's precept with respect to raising the rank and importance of the Party member higher and higher, Party commissions have an effective means of indoctrinating communists in a spirit of strict observance of state and military discipline and the strengthening of order and organization. And it is not just a matter of promptly finding and punishing the guilty parties, violators of discipline and their protectors. Party organs, including Party commissions, have a far broader and more important task. They must constantly help the Party organizations to analyze infractions as a whole--from the inception to the investigation--reveal the causes of the violations, work out and implement proposals for eliminating the shortcomings and establish control over implementation of the decisions adopted.

Party organizations need this kind of help. Certain Party organizations are still not taking sufficiently vigorous action to prevent infractions, and the results of their work are poor.

Party commissions are expected to set an example of good principle and demandingness in all things. This will be the decisive factor in their ability to strengthen discipline and organization, to develop ideological conviction and an active stance in life among the communists.

Unfortunately, the Party commissions do not always display proper demandingness in their evaluation of the service activities and the conduct of communists and sometimes take a liberal attitude toward violations of regulations and moral standards. Not in all cases are they working with Party members and candidate members who have received Party penalties or with those who are not conscientious in their service and their personal lives. This pertains, among others, to Party commissions under the

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political organs of military construction units and services, as well as to oblast military commissariats. Improper conduct on the part of individual communists is most frequently found where there is a lack of principle in the handling of these matters and where indoctrinational work is weak.

Party commissions have criticism and self-criticism as a powerful means of indoctrinating people. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambovskaya Oblast Party Organization" focuses attention upon the nature of this method of combating negative developments. It consists in objectively evaluating all aspects of the work of this or that organization, of this or that worker, of preventing a liberal attitude toward shortcomings and to those responsible for them. It is important to give constant attention to the development of criticism and self-criticism, to react sharply to improper attitudes toward those who make critical comments.

Recent years have seen the expansion of Party commission participation in investigations made in response to letters, complaints and statements with respect to violations of the CPSU Charter, communist moral and ethical standards and Party and military discipline on the part of individual communists. Certain Party commissions underestimate the importance of this, however, and investigate letters and complaints on a superficial level. At one time, for example, serious shortcomings were revealed in the way in which letters and statements from servicemen and workers were reviewed in the political section of the Black Sea Fleet's rear.

The Party Central Committee requires that we constantly improve our handling of letters from the workers and strictly follow decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress and the principles and tasks set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee and in his speech at the closing of the conference.

The more concretely Party commission work is directed by the political organs, the more effective it will be. The political directorates of the districts, groups of forces and fleets and the political sections of the units and formations have begun directing the Party commissions more objectively. Questions pertaining to the supervision of their work are periodically discussed in the political directorates of the services of the Armed Forces, the districts, groups of forces and fleets. Apparently, we will have to provide Party commissions with greater assistance in their work of improving the qualitative makeup of the Party and increasing the aggressiveness of Party organizations.

The more difficult the tasks involved in Soviet military organizational development, the higher must be the level of Party supervision of all its aspects and the more active Party organizations and each communist are expected to be. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the special, seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the fact that the Party's

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guiding and directing role in society is established by the Constitution does not give its members any sort of special privileges. On the contrary, it imposes even greater obligations upon them.

In accordance with Party requirements, political organs and Party commissions are expected to strive to see that every Party collective strictly observes Leninist standards of Party life and the principles of Party leadership, that a climate of real comradeship and a situation of principled criticism and self-criticism are firmly established throughout. One of our main tasks is now that of using all reserves for the benefit of the combat readiness of units and ships, of developing ideologically tempered and skillful fighting men, of strengthening order and organization.

Party-political work is properly referred to as a powerful Party tool. By making it more effective we are insuring further improvement of the fighting capacity of the Army and Navy and a strengthening of the Soviet homeland's defense capability.

FOOTNOTES

1. "60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy" [The 60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR], Moscow, 1978, p 9.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [With a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 51.
3. "60 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy," p 35.
4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i," Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 535.
5. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 325.
6. See "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 63.

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WE BUILD THE BAYKAL-AMUR MAINLINE

[Chapter by Lt Col F. Bondarenko, Party commission member in the unit political section]

The communists, all the railway troops, accepted the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the construction of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline as an extremely important general party and general state task. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this document with respect to improving the economy of that vast national region.

The Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline is the outstanding construction project of the century with respect to scale and to its economic and its social and political importance. The line will stretch around 3200 kilometers from Ust-Kut' to Komsomol'sk-na-Amure. Start-up of the second Transiberian route will make it possible to place extremely large deposits of high-quality coal and nonferrous metals at the service of the national economy. The wood processing and pulp and paper industries will be further developed, using the forests of Eastern Siberia. The new railroad will make it possible to develop the fertile land of the Far East and to improve foreign economic ties with the nations of the Pacific Ocean.

The railway troops are working selflessly on the Baykal-Amur Mainline. They are rightly proud of the trust demonstrated by the party and the people and are filled with resolve to justify that trust with excellent work and service.

It is both an honor and a responsibility to work on the All-Union Construction Project of the Century, to carry the title of a BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] worker. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers defines the tasks of the BAM workers with absolute clarity and precision, demanding personal organization and discipline of them from the very beginning.

The first years of work on the project are behind. The laying of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline is now in full swing. Overcoming difficulties and demonstrating great political awareness, courage and persistence, the railway troops are performing the honored assignment of the party and government with honor and dignity, successfully completing construction and installation plans month after month, and advancing further and further to the east. Winter and trackside roads were followed by the first hundreds of kilometers of main tracks, dozens of major bridges and hundreds of other civil engineering works have been released for use, and homes, schools, clubs, general out-patient clinics, stores and cultural and personal-service enterprises are being erected for the builders and for the future operators of the line.

An enormous upwelling of patriotic feeling and labor enthusiasm was elicited in the BAM workers by the national discussion and adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, preparations for the anniversary

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festivities devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet Armed Forces, materials and decisions coming out of the special session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the formal meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the December 1977 and July 1978 plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the speeches of Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. These documents formulate a scientifically based program for the party and the people in their campaign to fulfill the historic plans outlined at the 25th CPSU Congress, a program for the Soviet society's continued advance along the path to communism and for strengthening the nation's economic and defensive strength.

The success achieved in the first years of construction of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline have been in great part the result of constant initiative-filled and purposive party-political work by political organs and party organizations in the units and subunits and by the avant-garde role assumed by the communists. The party commissions are also making a significant contribution to the accomplishment of current tasks.

The work performed by party commissions in the Armed Forces, with its own specific aspects, has undergone marked changes in recent years. This phenomenon is inseparably linked with the undeviating implementation of the course set by the Communist Party aimed at further developing intra-party democracy, improving the fighting efficiency and solidarity of party ranks and insuring strict observance of Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership.

Party commissions are active in improving the style and methods of indoctrination of the communists and providing them with a model for the performance of party and service duty. These issues are covered in the party commission's work plans and are systematically studied in the units and subunits. The results of the study and the conclusions drawn therefrom are immediately reported to the chiefs of political organs for action and are explained to the party aktiv in the form of surveys and reports delivered at training methods councils and meetings of unit communists.

The goal-orientation and effectiveness of the work performed by the party commissions are greatly due to the concrete and operational supervision of the political organs. It has become normal procedure for our party commission secretaries and members to attend discussions of work organization projects, organizational-technical measures and party-political support plans. This practice makes it possible for the party commissions to be continuously aware of the rhythm of events at the project and to apply their efforts efficiently and exert daily influence upon the accomplishment of the main task, that of building the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline well and within the target dates.

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Issues pertaining to the growth of party ranks and the organizational and ideological strengthening of the party collectives have always occupied a central spot in the work of political organs and primary party organizations. They are especially important on the Baykal-Amur Mainline. The line runs almost entirely through uninhabited areas--totally roadless country, taiga, marshland and mountain ridges--where the helicopter was the only means of communication during the initial period of development for the project. In the beginning, small groups were landed, frequently lacking the most essential things for maintaining normal living and working conditions for subunits far removed from their main bases. The units, and sometimes even subunits, were distributed over several sites.

Political organs, party organizations and party commissions endeavored to extend party influence to every site. This demanded a creative approach to party-political work and constant concern for filling the party collectives with people capable of leading the personnel. Experience with party-political work in the construction of railway sections in Siberia and the Northern Urals was useful.

The growth in party ranks is contributing to the organizational strengthening of subunit party organizations and helping to increase their militancy. Communists assigned to the crucial sections of the line are inspiring the masses with their party word and irreproachable handling of their immediate duties to overcome difficulties and to fulfill and exceed construction and installation work plans and large socialist commitments.

In accordance with the instructions issued at the 25th CPSU Congress and the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of Kirgiziya's Party Organizations for Accepting Party Members and Indoctrinating Candidate Members of the CPSU," outstanding officers and warrant officers and specialists in the leading occupations--those who determine to a great degree the success of the construction work, insure regulation order at all the construction sites and determine how competently and efficiently the machinery and equipment are used--are selected for party membership. It is a rule of ours that every party commission member helps the primary party organizations to study the abilities and the moral-political qualities of comrades expressing a desire to enter the ranks of Lenin's party and help with the ideological preparation of candidates for membership in the CPSU right at the sites.

Almost all of the young communists are outstanding in the combat and political training. They consider it a matter of conscience to complete construction of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline on schedule and to perform the job well. And it is no surprise that the subunits commanded by officers I. Zubkov, V. Volodin, I. Gamzyakov and V. Oleynikov, who were recently accepted into the family of communists, have joined the ranks of the excellent. CPSU member Ye. Zuyev has been awarded the Lenin Komsomol Prize.

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Many military machinery specialists joining the party ranks are the best specialists in their field and achieve good work results at any time of the day and under all conditions.

"What party assignment are you performing?" Private A. Kovt', a dump truck driver, was asked.

"I perform a double shift quota!" was his matter-of-fact reply.

These words of the young communist reflect everything about him: his character, his attitude toward the job and his profound understanding of his party duty.

And one could not count the number of such party fighters at work on the BAM.

The Komsomol forms an important reserve for building up party organizations. "...The Komsomol," wrote M. I. Kalinin, "like the forge of a huge furnace, smelts and shapes the new Soviet man. The Komsomol is the first step for the youth, a step leading to broad public and political life, leading the youth into the party."¹

Komsomol members account for 82 percent of the military builders working on the BAM, and 86 percent of the young communists join the project through Komsomol organizations. These are Komsomol activists, secretaries of Komsomol committees and bureaus, Komsomol group organizers, outstanding machinery specialists, linesmen, bridge builders, demolition experts and other specialists. The forward edge of the struggle to lay the BAM rails has become a party cause and a vital necessity for these youth, graduates of the Lenin Komsomol. Sergeants A. Analikov and V. Mamot, Private First Class O. Romenets and Privates F. Alavidimov and V. Rasskazov, who only recently received their brand new party cards, have proven themselves as experienced construction workers who are taken as a model by hundreds of the fighting men. The young communists work with fervor, daily exceeding their shift assignments.

There is another important side of the Komsomol graduates' entry into the party family: The party nucleus in the Komsomol is strengthened considerably, and party leadership of Komsomol organizations is improved. The role and importance of Komsomol organizations in the communist indoctrination of the youth and the performance of important tasks involved in the building of the mainline increase, in turn.

Concern for filling the party collectives with worthy members and for the ideological conditioning of the young communists is an absolute condition

1. M. I. Kalinin, "O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge" [On Communist Indoctrination and the Fighting Man's Duty], Moscow, 1967, p 616.

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for purity in the CPSU ranks, for fighting efficiency on the part of party organizations and for intensifying and extending their influence upon all aspects of the life and work of units and subunits. Political organs and party commissions attempt to accustom candidates for CPSU membership to active public-political work and help the primary party organizations to monitor their moral-political growth and to select for each communist an assignment which contributes to the maximum evolution of his strengths and abilities. An absolute majority of CPSU candidate members have permanent party assignments involving, as a rule, various areas of the life of Komsomol organizations. The attention and concern surrounding the young communists permits them to establish themselves in the party collectives with greater confidence and to demonstrate their best qualities more clearly.

The young communist schools created within the party bureaus of the unit primary organizations have functioned well under BAM conditions. The students, candidate party members or CPSU members for less than 3 years, study the Program and the Charter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the new Soviet Constitution, materials from the 25th Party Congress and from plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, current issues of the Soviet state's internal and foreign policy and matters pertaining to party development. The classes are addressed by commanders, political workers, engineers and party commission members. The training in these schools help the young communists to develop an active stance in life and a sense of pride in belonging to Lenin's party, and to thoroughly master the principles underlying the organizational development of the CPSU, standards of party life and principles of party leadership.

The development of good moral-political and moral qualities and of a sense of civil responsibility for the performance of party and government assignments are inseparably linked with the immediate service activities of the communists: the improvement of construction output, the practical adoption of advanced methods of organizing the labor and socialist competition, and the creation of a climate in the labor collectives conducive to the development of steadfast, "BAM" character and the formation of the moral characteristics of the builder of the new society. Party commissions support and generalize progressive undertakings and see that they spread to all the collectives and all the projects. It is with good reason that the party commission members give a great deal of time and attention to individual work with the communist-leaders and engineers.

Party commissions are extensively involved along with officers from the political organs in conducting inspections in the units and subunits. They systematically check on primary party organizations to see that the communists are becoming more responsible for implementation of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the construction of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline and of orders and directives issued by the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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Party commission members speak with the communists in the primary party organizations, present lectures and reports, study the documents of party and Komsomol organizations and the state of political and military indoctrination of the personnel, reveal shortcomings and help the communists in positions of leadership in the units and formations to eliminate the causes. This sort of communication with fighting men engaged in building the BAM enhances the work of the party commission and brings it into great conformity with the needs and requirements of the construction project.

A commission member in one of the primary party organizations, for example, was informed of improper conduct on the part of communist V. Karmanov, who was violating financial discipline in the unit. After ascertaining that the accusation was just, the party commission presented the findings in their inspection to the commander and the political section chief. V. Karmanov was removed from the position and brought to strict party accountability. A special order was issued outlining steps for establishing proper order in unit financial and administrative affairs.

The party commissions along with the primary party organizations carefully monitor the situation to see that the communists perform their avant-garde role in the collectives and strive to improve construction effectiveness and quality, and hold strictly accountable those who lose their standing in the socialist competition. Specifically, it has been necessary to take party steps against officer N. Chukalov, whose negligence of his service duty resulted in unsatisfactory production results.

In order to improve the work of party commissions we must systematically train and instruct the secretaries, members and candidate members of party commissions. At seminars we discuss issues pertaining to the realization of decisions coming out of the 25th Party Congress and decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee on accepting new members into the party, indoctrinating the young communists and providing them with models in observing the Program and Charter of the CPSU and standards of communist morality and ethics, party, state and military discipline. Participants in one of the seminars heard the following reports: "Party Commissions for Establishing the Leninist Work Style in Construction of the BAM," "The Work Performed by Party Commissions to Verify the Implementation of Instructions Issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and Orders and Directives Issued by the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on the Construction of the BAM" and others.

Along with conducting blanket checks by assignment from the political section chief, the party commission frequently uses operational methods: The commission members inquire about specific aspects of the work, visit the sites to check on the implementation of their proposals and help

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prepare and conduct party aktivs and meetings. They attended all the report and election meetings, carefully analyzed and summarized the comments and requests aimed at improving their work, and added steps to accomplish valuable recommendations submitted by the communists to the long-range plans. Party commission participation in party meetings, aktivs and conferences provides them with extensive material for raising their level of activity.

Preparing the dirt in quarries and laying it as the roadbed for the road and the railway is one of the most important operations performed in the construction of the mainline. Planned production quotas were exceeded by 9 percent last year. Party commission members deserve a great deal of the credit for developing socialist competition among the mechanizers, which produced the success, and for defining the competition conditions. They explained the national economic importance of the project, kept the personnel informed of the tasks and the competition results and of advanced methods for organizing the work in the quarries, and helped the commanders and primary party organizations to provide the materials and equipment for the work.

The conditions under which the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline is being laid make it necessary to conserve construction materials, fuels and lubricants. Construction was begun over the entire line, at hundreds of sites. Supply bases were created in the open for there were no equipped warehouses or areas. Materials delivered by every possible means--from sled train to helicopters--were sometimes offloaded directly onto the snow, without proper preparation, and the resulting deformation and water-logging could have spoiled some of them. In addition, fuel and lubricant stocks are computed and released according to the construction and installations plan, while in the wintertime the equipment is used for most of the day on the BAM project and the personnel exceed the yearly assignments, working ahead of schedule.

Conservation measures are understandably of exceptional importance in this situation. At the political section's instruction, party commission members, along with people's controllers and Komsomol inspectors (prozhektoristy), called upon communists with the supply services and at warehouses and bases to demonstrate thrift, to exercise careful control over the storage and consumption of materials, to see that accurate records are kept and to hold responsible those individuals who have committed even insignificant violations of these requirements.

The BAM is expanding and growing today. The military railroad builders are confidently performing the difficult tasks: The plan for 1977, the anniversary year, was fulfilled 3 months ahead of schedule. More and more kilometers of the steel tracks are being laid under the difficult climatic and geological conditions. Through train traffic was initiated in the Dusse-Alinskiy Tunnel on the 53d anniversary of the awarding of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's name to the Komsomol, and the opening of the

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special, seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was commemorated by the arrival of the first train bearing national economic cargo at the station of Suluk.

The determined struggle to lay the BAM kilometers continues in the taiga. The best fighting men have repeatedly been delegates to rallies of competition winners on the BAM, conducted by the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee and the military councils of the railway troops in the Red Banner Far East Military District. Many right-flank competition participants have been singled out for awards and some comrades took part in the All-Army Rally of Competition Winners in Leningrad and were photographed on the legendary cruiser "Aurora."

We experienced a new outpouring of creative energy from the December 1977 decree passed by the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Letter from the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee on the development of socialist competition to fulfill and exceed the 1978 plan and on stepping up the campaign to improve production efficiency and work quality. These documents are a guide to action, calling for a storming of the difficult BAM positions, and a pointer to the heights we must take in the third year of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

It was a day of great celebration for the builders of the BAM, when on 4 April 1978 a group of Komsomol members, outstanding builders of the central BAM section, arrived at the station of Skovorodino in Amurskaya Oblast for a meeting with Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. "Not too long from now," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "new industrial complexes will be built in these regions by the labor of man. BAM will help us to make fuller use of the extremely rich storehouse of mineral wealth contained in this area and to resolve the problem of developing our production forces in a new way. This is a program of great state importance.

"This is what lies behind your noble and truly selfless labor, comrades."¹

The military railway builders are filled with determination to justify this high rating.

2. PRAVDA, 5 April 1978.

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ADVICE FOR SECRETARIES AND MEMBERS OF PARTY COMMISSIONS

The Charter of the CPSU, decisions adopted at party congresses, decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy define the organizational standards of intraparty life. The following provides the answers to questions arising most frequently in the practical work of party commissions.

Party Commissions Under Political Organs, Their Authority and Duties

Army party commissions have existed since the beginning of 1920. They are formed under the appropriate political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy and are directed by them.

Party commissions are elected at party conferences for a period of 2 or 3 years. The number of members and candidate members on a party commission is established at a party conference. The decision to advance candidate members to party commission membership is made at the sessions by open voting.

The composition of party commissions under the political directorates of services of the Armed Forces is determined by the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy at the recommendation of members of the military councils serving as chiefs of political directorates of the services of the Armed Forces.

The party commission under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is confirmed by the CPSU Central Committee at the recommendation of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Party commissions perform their duties in accordance with the Program and the Charter of the CPSU, decisions adopted at party congresses and decrees issued by the CPSU Central Committee, the Statute on Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. They are expected to increase the responsibility of communists for the implementation of party policy.

Party commissions within the political organs of regiments, large units (soyedineniye), military educational institutions and their equivalents are vested with authority to decide on questions pertaining to acceptance into the party and in cases of infractions by communists, up to expulsion from the CPSU ranks. They are empowered to confirm decisions made by primary Komsomol organizations or unit Komsomol committees on the expulsion of Komsomol members.

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The party commission secretary reports all decisions to the chief of the political organ.

Party commissions regulate the growth of party ranks, insuring absolute fulfillment of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the requirements contained in the party Charter on the selection of CPSU members on an individual basis.

The primary party organization's decision on acceptance as a party member takes effect after the decision has been approved by the party commission in the proper political organ. In the regiments (on ships) and equivalent units with party committees, a decision by a party organization with the authority of a primary organization to accept individuals as CPSU members is reviewed by the party committee, and not until the committee has reached an affirmative decision is it submitted for approval to the party commission in the political organ.

Those party commissions are proceeding properly, which analyze and discuss at their meetings the shortcomings and errors of those permitted to enter the party.

Party commissions see to it that candidates for membership in the CPSU receive ideological indoctrination, successfully complete the period of probation as candidate members and prepare to become members of the CPSU.

An extremely important task of party commissions consists in actively participating, under the leadership of party organs, in checks to see that the communists are observing the CPSU Program and Charter, party, state and military discipline, and standards of communist morality and ethics.

The main purpose of the checks is to improve the personal example set by the communists, to improve their morals and ethics.

At the assignment of the political organs, party commission members and candidate members systematically analyze the performance of party organizations with respect to accepting new party members, indoctrinating the young communist and insuring that they take an avant-garde role in the training and service, and verify letters, complaints and claims pertaining to improper actions on the part of individual communists. Individual talks with the communists by party commission members and candidate members, primarily with those against whom there are grievances, help the political organs and primary party organizations to prevent violations of party and military discipline.

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Party commissions review infractions by communists and Komsomol members. For failure to perform his duties as prescribed by the Charter and for other infractions, a CPSU member or candidate member is brought to accountability and a penalty may be imposed: a reproof, a reprimand (severe reprimand) or a reprimand (severe reprimand) entered in the individual's record.

Party indoctrination measures and party pressure are applied in the case of insignificant infractions. These include comradesly criticism, party censure, a warning or counseling.

Expulsion from the party is, of course, the most extreme party punishment. In deciding whether an individual should be expelled from the CPSU ranks, the case must be given the greatest possible consideration and the basis for the accusations made against the communist must be carefully analyzed.

A decision to accept an individual into the CPSU or to expel one from the party is considered final when at least two-thirds of the party members present at the meeting have voted in favor of it, and it takes effect following approval by the party commission of the proper political organ.

Infractions by communists are reviewed in the primary party organizations. The instructions to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy specify that infractions by communists in command of regiments, first- or second-rank ships, separate battalions, battalions (divizion) and equivalent line units or by their deputy commanders for political affairs, by commanders or chiefs of unit (soyedineniye) political sections, by the chiefs of military educational institutions and chiefs of the political sections of military educational institutions, and by members of the military councils of armies, flotillas, districts, groups of forces, fleets and services of the Armed Forces are reviewed directly in the party commission of the superior political organ by decision of the chief of that political organ.

Infractions by communists serving as commanders or deputy commanders for political affairs of battalions (batal'on, divizion) or equivalent line subunits are reviewed by the corresponding party committees of the regiments, ships or equivalent units, and in regiments with political sections, by the party commissions of those political organs.

The question of bringing to party accountability members of party commissions under the political sections of units (chast, soyedineniye), armies and flotillas and under the political directorates of districts, groups of forces, fleets and services of the Armed Forces are discussed in the primary party organizations. The decision to impose penalties upon the members of these party commissions is made by the usual procedure.

A recommendation by a primary party organization that a communist who is a member of the party commission be expelled from the CPSU is reviewed by the party commission of which he is a member and is passed by a majority vote by two-thirds of the party commission members.

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Decisions by party commissions on infractions by communists are reported to the appropriate primary party organizations at their general meetings.

The CPSU Charter allows those expelled from the party to submit an appeal to higher party organizations, up to the CPSU Central Committee, within a 2-month period. Party commissions review appeals within a period of no more than 1 month from the date of their receipt and make a decision.

An appeal for decision by the party commission of a unit political section is submitted to the party commission of the large unit (soyedineniye) or army, and an appeal for decision by the party commission of an army political section, to the district (or fleet) party commission, and then through the chain of party commission under the political directorate of a service of the Armed Forces and the party commission under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, up to the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee.

Party commissions see to the fulfillment of the requirement set by the CPSU Central Committee that, as a rule, party organizations hear a report from the communists within a year on rectification of the shortcomings for which they were brought to party accountability.

Party commission members and candidate members meet with communists upon whom party penalties have been imposed, attend their reports at meetings in the party organizations and help them to correct their errors.

Party commissions maintain close ties with commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations and thoroughly analyze everything pertaining to the service, the training and public activities of the communists and to their influence upon the fighting men.

Party commission members and candidate members participate in assemblies and seminars with political workers and with the party and Komsomol aktiv, regularly brief the communists on the party commission's work and explain the CPSU Program and Charter, decisions adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress and problems of party development in lectures, reports and talks.

The closer the party commissions' contacts with workers in the political sections and political directorates and with the people's control agencies and the more concrete their supervision of the political organs, the more successful is the work performed by the party commissions.

Proper planning of the party commissions' work has a great deal to do with the successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned them. Some party commissions include the basic measures planned for the month in the plans of the political organs, while others plan their work independently. There are no objections to either system. It is important that the party commissions see that the communists set a good example in the combat and political training, in party, state and military discipline and in the fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter.

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What areas of work are covered in the plans?

First and foremost, measures to provide party organizations with assistance in deciding specific questions pertaining to the acceptance of new party members and indoctrination of the young communists; consideration of infractions by communists and appeals; the investigation of letters, complaints and statements reporting improper behavior by individual communists; individual talks with communists upon whom party penalties have been imposed and with those against whom grievances have been submitted with respect to their service and conduct; and addresses by party commission members and candidate members on practical aspects of their work, delivered at seminars for the party and Komsomol aktiv and at party meetings on the fulfillment of decisions made at party conferences.

The plan should take into account the range of party commission duties defined by the Statute on Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The plans of certain party commissions improperly contain reports by commanders and political workers on the course of combat and political training and the strengthening of military discipline and regulation order, and those of party organization secretaries include reports on the state of party work in the unit or on the ship.

A plan, even a good and complete plan, does not in itself insure success. It calls for vigorous participation by all party commission members and candidate members in the performance of the measures outlined, the prompt summing up of the results and operational determination of tasks vital to the further improvement of the work methods and style of the party commissions.

The work plans are coordinated by time and task with the work of political organs.

Accountability of Party Commissions

The CPSU consistently pursues a course of developing intraparty democracy and the observance of Leninist standards of party life and of party leadership principles.

The party consistently adheres to the principle of electiveness and accountability on the part of leading party organizations.

Party commissions are elected at party conferences and report to them on their work. It has become the rule in most political organs for party commission secretaries and members systematically to brief them on the work of the party commissions for the specific period at meetings of the party aktivs and primary party organizations.

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The regular briefing of communists by the party commissions on the fulfillment of decisions made at party conferences and conclusions reached on infractions by communists, appeals and the acceptance of new CPSU members helps to increase the role of party organizations in the development of accountability on the part of the communists for observance of the CPSU Program and Charter, party, state and military discipline, and communist moral and ethical standards. In addition, it makes it possible promptly to detect errors in the work of party organizations and of the party commission itself and to eliminate them promptly and effectively.

Assignments for Members and Candidate Members of Party Commissions

The party commission's work is arranged by the secretary, who answers directly to the chief of the political organ for the state of that work. The level of activity of the party commission, however, and the degree of its influence upon the communists are greatly determined by the participation of the party commission members and candidate members in its work.

Party commission members and candidate members thoroughly study questions pertaining to acceptance in the CPSU ranks, talk with candidates for party membership about their probation period as candidates and systematically inquire about how communists upon whom party penalties have been imposed are correcting the errors for which they were brought to party responsibility. When necessary, the party commission secretary may instruct party commission members and candidate members to make additional investigations into infractions by communists and their appeals, as well as letters, statements and reports on improper conduct by communists.

As a rule, party commission members and candidate members speak at party meetings, explain problems of party development and participate in seminars for the party and Komsomol aktiv.

The abilities and possibilities of each member of the elected party organ should be taken into account when making assignments.

Does the party commission have the right to accept a candidate for membership in the CPSU if the primary party organization has rejected him?

When the primary party organization has rejected a candidate for party membership but the party commission members consider the decision to be unfounded, the party commission may recommend that the primary party organization reconsider the matter at a party meeting, taking into account new circumstances not previously known.

The party commission may call upon one of its members to speak at the meeting and to inform the communists as to the party commission's opinion. If the initial decision is reaffirmed at the party meeting, the party commission may not disregard the will of the primary party organization and accept the candidate as a party member. This would be contrary to the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter.

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How long is a recommendation for acceptance into the CPSU valid?

In accordance with the CPSU Charter, each individual entering the party submits recommendations from three CPSU members who have been members of the party for at least 5 years and have known the individual recommended for membership for at least 1 year in production or public work. Candidates for membership in the Komsomol must have a recommendation from the primary Komsomol organization, approved by the Komsomol committee and certified by the unit deputy commander for political affairs, and where there is no deputy commander for political affairs, by the political section chief or his assistant for Komsomol work. In order to recommend a Komsomol member for party membership, a Komsomol organization must have known him for at least a year.

Recommendations must objectively describe the political, work and moral qualities of the comrade recommended.

Party organizations and party commissions are expected constantly to teach the communists to take an aware attitude toward their right to give recommendations and remind them of the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter and the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of Kirgiziya's Party Organizations in Accepting New Party Members and Indoctrinating CPSU Candidate Members" on responsibility for party recommendations.

The CPSU Charter does not specify the period of effectiveness of a party recommendation and does not indicate how long it is in force. This does not mean, however, that any recommendation can be accepted, regardless of the date it was written up.

It is customary to accept as valid party recommendations issued no earlier than 5 to 6 months prior to the primary party organization's meeting at which the request for acceptance into the CPSU is considered.

What is a personal case?

The CPSU Charter and the party congress decisions require that every communist value his membership in Lenin's party. The indisputable authority of the CPSU is made even stronger by the fact that it vigilantly guards the solidarity, purity and staunchness of its ranks. The party holds strictly accountable those whose conduct is not in keeping with the great title of communist.

A personal file is a file on an infraction by a communist. It is created when there is a party investigation of serious deviations from the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter, party, state and military discipline or communist moral and ethical standards.

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In order to properly evaluate the facts and to avoid erroneous conclusions, it is necessary thoroughly to investigate the nature of the infraction and to establish the degree of guilt on the part of the communist. The personal file contains evidence provided by witnesses and documents confirming the improper actions by a CPSU member or candidate member.

A thorough and objective investigation is an absolute requirement for a substantiated and just decision on a personal case.

Is a personal case instigated for all infringements by a communist?

When a communist has violated the established rules of conduct, the party organization must in each specific case study the nature of the infraction and depending upon the infraction, decide whether to bring the CPSU member or candidate member to party accountability. In all cases, however, the party organization is required to respond in a principled and uncompromising manner to improper behavior by communists.

Intolerance of violations of party, state and military discipline and of communist moral and ethical standards, and strict accountability constitute one of the most effective means of indoctrination.

We should not go to the other extreme, however, initiating a personal file for any petty reason or any blunder by a communist. There is no need to create a personal file when the party organization applies party indoctrinational measures or pressure to a CPSU member or candidate member in the form of comradely criticism, party censure, a warning or counseling.

In what instances and what material is submitted to the party commission on infractions by communists?

Party pressures to be applied to communists committing infractions are defined by the CPSU Charter. If the primary party organization feels it necessary to impose a party penalty upon a communist and enter it in his records or to expel him from the party, it is mandatory that such a decision be reviewed by the party committee of the regiment (or ship) and upon confirmation, be sent to the party commission.

The file on an infraction by a communist must contain all the documents which can help to make an objective investigation of the case and reach a substantiated decision. As a rule, it includes the following:

the statement, letter, report or other materials on a communist's violation of the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter, that is, the documents serving as the basis for initiating the personal case;

materials confirming the accusations made--statements or accounts by accessories in the case, reports by auditing bodies, statements on the results of checks, materials provided by investigatory and judicial bodies, copies of orders, and so forth;

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- a written explanation by the communist on the nature of the accusations made;
- party and service references;
- a report on the results of the party investigation;
- a copy of the record of the party organization meeting and the party committee session;
- a report by the secretary or the party commission member who verified and reported on the personal case at the party commission meeting;
- a copy of the party commission's decision witnessed by the party commission secretary and certified with the party organ's stamp.

If the communist appeals the party commission's decision in the party commission under the superior party organ, the following are added to the personal file: the communist's statement of appeal; a copy of the basic information from the title page of his record and information on his job performance and party penalties; a copy of his service record; old personal files (or copies of decisions) on the institution of party proceedings and the listing of party penalties; a report or memorandum from a member of the party commission on the appeal and on the personal case, which is submitted to the higher authority for review; the party commission's decision on the communist's appeal; a signed statement by the comrade submitting the appeal to the effect that the party commission's decision has been explained to him.

All the documents on the communist's infraction are filed together in chronological order, from top to bottom, and must include a list of the contents of the file. Files are kept in the political organ as classified documents until the established period has elapsed and they are turned over to the archives.

What is the procedure for considering cases of infractions by communists in the party commissions?

The file on a communist's infraction is sent to the party commission if the penalty announced by the party organization requires approval, that is, when it involves a reprimand or a severe reprimand entered in the record, in the case of expulsion from the party, and in those cases when the communist against whom party proceedings are instituted appeals the decision (regardless of the punishment) to the higher party organ.

As a rule, when the party commission receives the personal file, it arranges an investigation and verification of the case at the site of the infraction.

The party commission secretary or member talks with the communist against whom party proceedings have been instituted and acquaints him with the personal file.

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The party organization secretaries and other officials who know the communist who has erred from working with him and can provide the necessary explanations and information on the issue under discussion are invited to the party commission sessions at which the personal cases are discussed.

Reports are made at the party commission session by the secretary of the party organization and by the secretary or a member of the party commission, after which the accused communist is given the opportunity to explain and assess his infraction.

A decision is reached after thorough discussion of the case, which is immediately announced to the communist.

The most important thing is to insure that the consideration of the communist's act is objective and that the conclusions drawn from it are just.

The procedure for discussing personal cases must be strictly followed at all party levels. In certain cases the chief of the political organ may make a decision to consider at a meeting of the party commission an infraction by a communist which is not covered in Point 18 of the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy. However, this should not be done for purposes of protecting the communist from just criticism and from a principled party review of his infraction.

The party commission explains every decision on personal cases not only to those communists whose infractions are being investigated, but also to all CPSU members and candidate members at a general meeting of the party organization.

Does a communist have the right to see documents in the file on his infraction?

A communist against whom party proceedings have been instituted has the right to demand thorough verification of the accusations made and to see the material pertaining to his infraction, including the report on the party investigation.

How do we consider requests for the restoration of party membership for those who have not met the deadline for submitting an appeal?

When an individual expelled from the CPSU has not bothered to initiate proceedings to have the decision altered or rescinded within the time specified, that is, if he has submitted the appeal after the established date has elapsed, such a request should be considered by the ordinary procedure and not as an appeal.

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Should party commissions consider requests for restoration of party membership or a change in a party penalty if it is submitted by communists who are relatives, acquaintances, or friends of the individual brought to accountability by the party?

Such requests should be considered in the normal procedure and not as appeals.

It must be explained to a communist receiving a party penalty that he must personally appeal to the proper party organ for restoration in the party or for a change in the party penalty.

If a primary party organization gives a communist a reprimand but the party commission considers the punishment too mild, not appropriate to the gravity of the infraction committed, does the party commission have the right to request the file on the communist's infraction for consideration as a control procedure at its session?

If a party commission feels that the party organization has made a too-liberal decision, one not in keeping with the nature of the communist's infraction or the degree of his guilt, it may, as the higher party organ in such matters, demand the file as a control procedure and discuss it at its meeting. It is the duty of the party commission to use specific cases to teach party organization secretaries how infractions by a communist should be discussed.

Decisions by a party commission which alter resolutions by party organizations must be reported to the CPSU members and candidate members.

Do party penalties specified by the Charter of the CPSU apply to candidate members of the party?

CPSU candidate members fulfill all the requirements set by the CPSU Charter for party members. They bear full responsibility for observing standards of party life, party, state and military discipline, and communist moral and ethical standards.

Party penalties specified in the CPSU Charter apply to both party members and candidate members.

Is temporary expulsion from the party for a certain period permissible?

It is incorrect for a party commission's decision to expel a member of the party to include a provision that it be reviewed after a certain period of time at the petition of the primary party organization. This was once the practice, but it was abolished by a special directive issued by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) on 9 December 1926.

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May a communist who has dropped out of the party through a loss of organization ties with it be restored to membership in the CPSU?

This is permitted when it has been determined that the decision to leave the party was in error. The primary party organization must pass a resolution canceling the initial decision and must petition the party commission to restore the communist to the CPSU ranks. If the party commission finds the grounds presented by the primary party organization convincing, it may restore the communist to party membership.

May a primary organization bring a member of an elected party organ to accountability?

Yes, it may, with the exception of individuals whose infractions under Point 18 of the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy are not subject to review in the primary party organizations.

There is a common party discipline in the party, which is mandatory for all communists, including members of an elected party organ. Members of the party committees (or party bureaus) of primary party organizations, who have not justified the trust of the communists and have abused the honor and dignity of a party organ member, are brought to party accountability, and the party organization decides on their continued membership in the elected organ by open voting.

When a communist elected to a party organ commits an infraction incompatible with membership in the party and a party meeting adopts a decision to expel him from the ranks of the CPSU, he is automatically removed from the membership of that party organ.

May a communist who has committed an infraction simply be removed from the party organ without being given a party penalty?

Under the CPSU Charter every communist who commits an infraction is brought to party accountability and receives some penalty.

Removal of a communist from an elected party organ is not considered a party penalty.

Is it mandatory to issue an announcement that a party penalty has been lifted?

A penalty may be lifted at the petition of the communist himself or at the initiative of the primary party organization, if it is convinced that the comrade has derived the necessary lessons from his errors. If the communist has been brought to party accountability by the party commission itself, the penalty is lifted at the petition of the primary party organization.

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In accordance with Point 18 of the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, the question of lifting party penalties from party members and candidate members occupying service positions is considered and decided at the request of the communist or at the initiative of the party committee (or party bureau) in that party unit (or a corresponding one) which imposed the party penalty.

If, at the time the question of lifting the party penalty is raised, the communist occupies a position not covered in the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, the question of lifting the penalty is considered and decided beginning with the primary party organization.

What documents must go into the file on the lifting of a party penalty from a communist?

This question should be considered in light of the punishment and the party level at which it was imposed. A penalty imposed upon a communist by decision of a party organization, which is not entered in his records, may be lifted on the basis of a personal request by the communist or at the instigation of the party organization. In this case, there is no need to institute special proceedings.

When deciding whether to lift a party penalty which has been entered in the communist's records, a copy of the record of the party meeting and the communist's service and party records must be attached to his petition.

By what procedure do party commissions consider announcements on the lifting of party penalties from communists?

Decisions by party commissions under political organs on the lifting of party penalties imposed by those party organs or their equivalents are final.

If the party penalty was imposed upon a communist by decision of the party commission under the political directorate of a district, fleet or group of forces, the only requirement for considering the lifting of the party penalty is that two party levels--the primary party organization and the party commission under the political section in which the communist is carried on the party roster--request this.

This does not mean, however, that the party organs do not have the authority to decide on the lifting of party penalties in general, without petitioning, or to request the opinion of the proper party commissions if necessary.

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Which party commission should consider the question of lifting a party penalty if the communist has been transferred to another unit after the primary party organization has made the decision?

The primary party organization sends a decision to lift a party penalty which has been entered in the records to the party commission under the political organ where the communist is currently carried on the roster. After the primary party organization has made the decision, the communist must therefore completely resolve the question of the lifting of his party penalty in the given unit (chast, soyedineniye) before leaving for his new station.

May a party commission verify reports on deficiencies on a communist's service performance?

The Statute on Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy requires that party commissions take an active part under the leadership of political organs in checking on the fulfillment of the CPSU Charter and the observance of party, state and military discipline by the communists. In all their activities, they strive to raise the level of responsibility of CPSU members and candidate members for the implementation of party policy.

The party commission has the right to verify reports on shortcomings in a communist's service, to thoroughly analyze their errors and their character, to issue opinions based on principle on such matters and to establish the degree of guilt of a party member or candidate member.

The party commission secretary reports the results of the investigation of such a report and its suggestions to the chief of the political organ for a decision.

From what date is a penalty period calculated when the communist's punishment has been changed as a result of an appeal?

In this case, the party penalty should be considered from the date of the party commission's decision to alter the communist's punishment by appeal or as a control procedure.

Considering the Personal Cases of Communists Who Have Committed Infractions Punishable Under Criminal Law

Paragraph 12 of the CPSU Charter states: "If a party member has committed infractions punishable by law, he is expelled from the party and is brought to accountability in accordance with the Law." This requirement is in full conformity with Lenin's instructions on the inadmissibility of using the governing party's position to reduce the accountability of communists for violating Soviet laws.

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The institution of criminal proceedings involving communists, the inquest and the transfer of the case to a court for consideration are carried out by the regular procedure, on the general grounds. When criminal proceedings are initiated against a party member or candidate member the Procurator's Office and the court inform the appropriate political organ and provide the information necessary to decide on his party membership.

With sufficient grounds (the infraction is obvious and there is no doubt as to the individual's guilt) the question of party membership for a communist who has committed an infraction punishable by law should be resolved before the case reaches the court, as a rule. In certain cases, however, this is done after the inquest or the court proceedings have been concluded. Under certain circumstances, party commissions may reconsider a decision already made on party membership when this becomes necessary because additional facts which were not previously known and which altered the case come to light during the inquest or the court proceedings.

A situation is also possible in which a communist who has committed an infraction is not to be punished under criminal law by the court but by administrative order. When this is true, his case is judged by party procedure on the basis of standards of party life and the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter.

May a member be expelled from the party in his absence?

Under the CPSU Charter, a party member has the right to be present at party meetings and party commission sessions when his work or his conduct is in question. This makes it possible for the party organization or party commission to conduct a more careful and thorough investigation of the grounds for the accusations made against the communist and helps to arrive at the proper decision.

The matter of party membership may be decided in the absence of the communist in certain cases: when the communist against whom proceedings have been initiated has refused to appear at the party meeting or the party commission session, for example, or when he has submitted a written statement agreeing to permit his case to be considered in his absence, as well as when the communist has been arrested and is under guard.

What is the period specified for considering personal cases?

The CPSU Charter states that appeals by those expelled from the party and by those receiving penalties, as well as decisions by party organizations to expel party members, are considered by the appropriate party organs within a period of no more than 1 month from the date of their receipt. Neither the party Charter nor the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy specifies periods for discussing infractions by

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communists in the primary party organizations. And the reasons are clear. Time is required to prepare a case for discussion at a bureau session or a party meeting. The fate of a communist must not be decided on the basis of hastily gathered documents, without making a thorough investigation of the matter and without clarifying all its aspects. A superficial study of a case may give the wrong slant or the wrong impression at a meeting.

In order to avoid errors and any sort of misunderstanding, an attitude of total responsibility must be taken in preparing personal cases for discussion at party meetings and party commission sessions. Naturally, certain facts and specific appraisals and conclusions can be clarified in the course of the discussion, but it is important to be certain in the most important matter--that the specific infraction is properly understood and interpreted and has been assessed on the basis of party principle.

We cannot accept the fact, however, that time limits for the discussion of personal cases are of no importance at all.

The primary party organization is required to take immediate action in the case of every infraction by a communist, to strive to see that the matter is investigated rapidly and in a competent manner. Sluggishness and unwarranted delay in the consideration of an infraction reduce the indoctrinational significance of the very fact of its discussion.

Is it mandatory that a communist be brought to party accountability if a disciplinary measure has been imposed upon him?

The CPSU Charter extends no privileges whatsoever to communists. On the contrary, it imposes greater responsibility upon them for the observance of party and state discipline, Soviet laws and moral standards.

Party discipline is inseparable from state discipline, including military. This is predicated by the party's guiding role in the Soviet state. The party has a common discipline for all communists, regardless of their merits or of the positions they occupy. Party organizations and party commissions must not ignore service infractions by communists or violations by them of the requirements made by military discipline or of the order or the rules defined in the regulations and manuals of the Armed Forces of the USSR and in orders and instructions issued by commanders and chiefs.

This does not mean, however, that in every case a communist upon whom a disciplinary penalty has been imposed should be brought to party accountability. In its consideration and principled appraisal of an infraction by a CPSU member or candidate member, the party organization or party commission may consider the fact that the comrade has already been punished and limit itself to measures of party pressure and indoctrination.

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The CPSU teaches party organizations and party commissions to take the fate of communists seriously, to objectively investigate the infractions committed by them in each specific case and to decide the question of bringing them to party accountability on the basis of those results.

May improprieties committed during the review of a communist's personal case be used as the basis for an appeal?

Under the Charter individuals expelled from the party, as well as communists who have received penalties, have the right to submit an appeal to higher party organs, up to and including the CPSU Central Committee.

Shortcomings and errors committed during the investigation of a communist's infractions or of the circumstances under which they took place, or failure to observe the rules and the procedure established for considering a personal case resulting in an infringement upon the communist's rights may serve as valid grounds for an appeal.

Must individuals who have accused a communist without justification or have investigated his personal case without objectivity bear party accountability?

Party members and candidate members who have accused a communist by design or have demonstrated a lack of objectivity in investigating the accusations made against him are brought to accountability under the CPSU Charter, since they have violated standards of party life and the moral principles of a party member.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO METHODS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 79
signed to press 8 Oct 79 pp 27-32

[Article by Col (Res) Yu. Korolev, candidate of military sciences,
docent: "Engineer Support of the Division Attack — According to the
Views of U.S. and West German Experts"]

[Text] Each year the command of the aggressive NATO bloc conducts numerous troop exercises near the state boundaries of the socialist countries. These are clearly provocative actions. At exercises of the "Reforger" type they work basically on questions of waging offensive operations, giving substantial attention not only to the use of the formations and units of the armies of the NATO countries in combat but to comprehensive support for troop actions, including engineer support.

Foreign military specialists believe that engineer support for the attack is one of the chief types of support to division combat actions. Its primary objective is to step up the pace of advance of the attacking units and subunits on the field of battle and the primary missions are to carry on continuous engineer reconnaissance of terrain, overcome the system of obstacles in front of the forward edge and in the depth of the enemy defense, set up and maintain crossings over water barriers, and the like.

As the foreign press emphasizes, such support is organized continuously, and the main forces of engineer subunits are concentrated on the primary missions (in the key sectors). The division engineer directly manages planning for engineer support of an attack. He determines the type of support, its scope, and order of performance.

Engineering reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain should provide the commander with reliable information on engineering preparations by the enemy, the nature of the terrain in the zone of division actions (for example road passability, the presence of water obstacles and difficult sectors to cross, the condition of bridges), the outfitting of enemy

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positions and regions in front of the forward edge and in the depth of the defense, the system of obstacles, and so on.

All this information is gathered constantly both during preparation for the attack and during combat actions. As the manuals and regulations of the U. S. and West German armies observe, engineering reconnaissance is carried on in close cooperation with combined arms units and sub-units.

To perform the missions of engineer reconnaissance engineer observation posts, engineer reconnaissance patrols and groups, and engineer photography posts are set up in the zone of division attack. They are all organized with personnel of subunits of the first echelon and the division combat engineer battalion.

In the estimate of foreign military experts, one division of the West German ground forces can form up to 14 ground engineer reconnaissance elements, one or two underwater elements, and one or two air engineer observation posts.

With the personnel and equipment of the combat engineer battalion of a U. S. division it is possible to form two or three engineer observation posts and one-three engineer reconnaissance groups. The engineer observation posts are capable of carrying on engineering reconnaissance to a depth of five kilometers. The reconnaissance groups operate in the depth of the enemy defense, usually in cooperation with the reconnaissance groups of the division reconnaissance battalions. They may be as much as 75 kilometers from the first-echelon subunits and units.

According to military specialists of the armies of the NATO countries, the principal objects of engineer reconnaissance during the period of preparation for an attack and during combat actions are existing roads, routes of travel for division subunits and units, ways to carry out troop maneuvers along the front and in depth, water barriers, bridges, obstacles, and the like. Obstacle reconnaissance occupies a special place, above all scouting minefields and places where land mines have been placed.

The foreign press observes that engineer reconnaissance occupied a significant place in the combat training and exercises conducted in 1978 and 1979 by the armies of the NATO countries. During the organization and waging of combat actions particular attention was given to the following factors: the nature and passability of the terrain on which the formations and units were operating; the condition of the road networks, especially the actual roadways; the existence and arrangement of tunnels, their length, width, and heights; the condition of bridges and water crossings and their alignment with maps. Foreign specialists believe that the personnel of all combat arms should study the procedures of engineer reconnaissance.

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According to reports in the foreign military press it is suggested that combat engineer subunits be enlisted to carry on engineer reconnaissance in the interests of first-echelon brigades, to which they are attached for the period of combat actions. For example, the brigades of a U. S. division operating in the first echelon may be given one or two combat engineer companies from the division combat engineer battalion. In addition to engineer support for attacking subunits, reconnaissance of the terrain is organized and conducted using the personnel and equipment. The engineer reconnaissance groups allocated by them are usually included in troop reconnaissance subunits.

One of the key jobs during preparation for and conduct of offensive actions is engineer reconnaissance of enemy obstacles, including detection of minefields. Foreign military periodicals emphasize that the success of the attack depends significantly on solving this problem.

It is thought that systems of minefields can be identified most effectively by comparing data from ground and aerial reconnaissance. Therefore, more and more often foreign experts have been saying that aircraft equipped with the lightest means of detection must be used extensively to scout minefields. For example, the METRRA helicopter radar mine detection system is in the final stage of development in the U. S. Army (see Figure 1 [not reproduced]). This system permits the identification of mines on the surface of the earth in any weather, day or night, and in regions with thick vegetation.

The Bundeswehr command is also devoting considerable attention to increasing the effectiveness of engineer reconnaissance of the enemy. According to reports in the West German press, combat engineer subunits have received new models of engineering and reconnaissance equipment in recent years. Personnel combat training plans give special attention to teaching methods of waging this kind of reconnaissance and they are practiced at various types of exercises. The ARE amphibious engineer reconnaissance vehicle (see Figure 2 [not reproduced]) has been developed in West Germany to scout water obstacles. Its equipment makes it possible to determine the width and depth of a body of water, the characteristics of the shores and bottom, and the current velocity with sufficient accuracy. In the opinion of West German military experts, the effectiveness of engineer reconnaissance will rise significantly when this vehicle is adopted (which is expected in the early 1980's).

Overcoming the system of obstacles in front of the forward edge and in the depth of the enemy defense may, foreign military experts believe, have a significant impact on the entire course of the division's attack. It is observed that the success of combat actions depends greatly on reliable detection of minefields and the number of passages in them which it is recommended to make depending on the way in which the division is waging its attack: on the run or with advance preparation.

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The first method is used when troops do not have time for careful reconnaissance of minefields and advance preparation of passages. In this case the forward units of the division usually make passages using explosives. Broad use of multiple rocket systems, specially equipped helicopters and tanks, artillery fire, and air strikes is also envisioned.

According to reports in the foreign military press, the SLU-FAE mine clearing system is being developed for U. S. engineer troops. It is a multiple rocket system using air explosion ammunition. With this system a passage 10-12 meters wide and 100 meters long can be made in a minefield in 3-5 minutes.

Another means is the FAE-SHED helicopter system in which T/O air-explosion bombs are used to make passages. As the press testifies, the explosion of two such bombs forms passages 8-10 meters wide and 100 meters deep.

The LAND-FAE tank mine clearing system is in the development stage. It resembles the flame throwing tank in principle of operation. A liquid substance is ejected under great pressure and changes to an explosive aerosol which is then detonated. In testing a passage 26 meters deep and wide enough for a tank to use was made in a minefield after one shot.

In the second instance the passages through minefields are usually made after careful reconnaissance. Combat engineers or trained subunits of other combat arms clear the mines with special equipment.

The locations of passages are determined in conformity with the commander's plan of battle, terrain conditions, the position of the enemy, and the extent of obstacles and barriers; the width and number of passages are determined by the capabilities of the supporting engineer subunits.

Combat engineers usually make passages in minefields on the day before the attack. For infantry they are 0.9-2.0 meters wide with at least one passage per infantry company. There are no set norms for tank subunits, so the commander decides how many passages he needs per company according to the actual situation.

In some cases when the situation dictates, elongated charges (bangalore torpedoes) are used to make passages through minefields. The U. S. Army, for example, uses type M173 charges which are delivered to the minefield by solid-fuel rockets and detonated by an electric detonator located in the tail unit of the charge.

Bundeswehr troops have a similar device consisting of a detonating fuse with concentrated explosive charges weighing about 100 kilograms

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in all secured to it. It is delivered to the minefield by solid-fuel rocket and makes a passage about one meter wide and more than 50 meters deep.

Passages are often laid out manually, especially when precautionary measures must be observed during preparation for an attack. It is preferable to do this during the hours of darkness, or under cover of smoke-screens and fire during the day.

By the start of the attack the finished passages should be marked with standard signs and signals.

While they attach great importance to using combat engineer subunits to overcome obstacles in the path of division offensive actions, the commands of the armies of the NATO countries also require that infantry and other subunits be adequately trained to overcome obstacles and natural barriers and make passages in minefields on their own.

As the foreign military press remarks, after a subunit finds a minefield during an attack it digs in on the terrain and reconnoiters the boundaries of the field and possible ways around it. Personnel actions are supported by the fire of available weapons and concealed by smoke-screens. If no bypasses are found, a mine clearing group is appointed which begins making the passage. As the group advances into the minefield it marks all mines which are detected. They are then destroyed in place or pulled out with grappling irons. When the passages have been made and marked, about one-third of the subunit personnel cross the minefield and provide security on its far edge. After this the remainder of the subunit crosses and performance of the mission continues.

There is an alternative way to cross a minefield. While the infantry is dismounting to scout the field and organize security the commander of the tank group gives the order to move a tank with a mine-clearing roller out in front. This tank makes the passage under cover of weapons fire and a smokescreen and the other tanks of the group advance along it.

NATO military specialists, attaching great importance to increasing the average daily rate of advance of the division, are searching for the most effective ways and means of crossing minefields. The West German ground forces, for example, are developing the LSM mine clearing device which is expected to improve efficiency in making passages through minefields. The U. S. Army has found a new way to overcome anti-infantry minefields: using a quick-hardening polyurethane based foam. A dispenser is being built for this purpose which will enable combat vehicles to cross a minefield with an average pressure on the ground of 0.7 kilograms per square centimeter. Work is continuing to improve tank minesweepers. The foreign press emphasizes that the

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research underway in this area will help increase the rate of advance of units and subunits and reduce losses of combat equipment and personnel.

In the official documents of the armies of the NATO countries, setting up and maintaining water crossings is considered one of the most important jobs of engineer support for the advance of division units and subunits.

The NATO command begins by expecting that with a rate of advance of up to 50 kilometers a day in the Central European theater a division may encounter 5-10 narrow water obstacles and one or two medium-sized bodies of water each day, and one broad obstacle every third day. Crossing them requires careful planning and good organization and control. The availability of sufficient engineer personnel and equipment is considered an important condition of success. The basic requirements made of the crossing operation are that it should be done on a broad front, simultaneously in several sectors, and without interruption.

The armies of the NATO countries have adopted two methods of crossing bodies of water: on the run and with advance preparation. The choice between them will be determined by the combat situation, nature of enemy resistance, and the availability of means of crossing.

Crossing on the run is considered most effective. In this case it is recommended that T/O amphibious armored personnel carriers and vehicles, self-propelled ferries, and tanks equipped to cross deep fords and travel under water be used to move the forward subunits across quickly. The division main forces will cross at bridges and by other means under cover of the forward subunits and tactical airborne landing parties.

The crossing with advance preparation is used when the enemy has set up a strong defense and the body of water represents a serious obstacle, while there are no readily available engineer forces with landing and pontoon bridge devices.

Regardless of the method of crossing, to perform the most labor-intensive engineer support jobs when crossing a broad water obstacle it is recommended that a first-echelon division of the U. S. Army operating in the primary axis be reinforced with one or two combat engineer battalions and two or three (self-propelled) floating bridge companies. According to the views of the command of the West German ground forces, a division operating in the first echelon can be reinforced with a light combat engineer battalion and one or two amphibious engineer companies taken from the engineer troops of the corps.

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The division is not usually reinforced for crossing narrow and medium-sized water obstacles because the specialists believe that it has sufficient T/O crossing means.*

On the shore landing, ferry, and bridge crossing points (sectors in American terminology) are set up along with points for vehicles that are fording or crossing under water. The number of such points depends on the tactical situation, the assigned rate of crossing, and the availability of necessary crossing means.

For each brigade of a first-echelon mechanized (motorized infantry) division of the U. S. (West German) Army three or four landing points and four or five ferry crossing points are set up, as well as two or three bridge points if the water obstacle is less than 200 meters across. There can be 15-30 different points in the crossing sector.

The forward subunits usually cross the water in amphibious armored personnel carriers, while tanks and other equipment use ferries and bridges (see Figure 3 [not reproduced]). For narrow and medium-sized rivers it is envisioned that one ferry will be used at each ferry crossing, while for wide rivers there will be two or three. The bridge crossing points are planned to go into operation 4-5 hours after the crossing begins. Helicopters are frequently used to deliver crossing gear to the river region.

Booms and net barriers are set up 200-300 meters from the bridge on both sides to protect it against floating mines and saboteurs; they are usually covered by weapons fire.

Some American military experts believe that when adequate amphibious vehicles and self-propelled fleets are available a division can cross a medium-width water obstacle on the run in 5-6 hours or even less.

In the assessment of Western military specialists, further improvements in the system of engineer support for offensive operations by formations will enhance the ability of troops to perform their assigned missions while waging combat actions.

* For more detailed discussion of the crossing means of the armies of the NATO countries see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE 1978, No 12, pp 31-39 (Editors).

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AIR SUPERIORITY: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO CONCEPTS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 79
signed to press 8 Oct 79 pp 43-47

[Article by Col Yu. Kartenichev, candidate of military sciences, and Col V. Tarabanov, candidate of military sciences and docent: "The Struggle for Superiority in the Air — Based on the Views of Foreign Military Experts"]

[Text] After a study of experience with the use of aviation in local wars and analyzing the results of numerous exercises and experiments, foreign military experts have reached the conclusion that aviation is now one of the most mobile components of the Unified Armed Forces of NATO, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of operations in a theater. Specifically, American General V. Hallway emphasizes that a high degree of superiority in the air may have a decisive influence on the final outcome of battle. Other military experts and representatives of the commands of the armed forces of the NATO countries have reached similar conclusions.

In the foreign press the concept of "air superiority" means achieving a situation in the air (at a certain time and in a certain region) in which friendly ground forces, naval forces, and aviation have a chance to perform their missions successfully without encountering serious, organized enemy resistance from the air. The crucial condition, the first step, is considered to be achieving superiority over enemy aviation and air defense. Therefore, NATO specialists devote increasing attention to solving this problem, on both the theoretical and the practical levels.

In their opinion, the struggle for air superiority begins far from the region of combat actions and long before the armed clash and it continues all the way until combat operations cease. Success depends largely on a correct understanding and timely consideration of the factors underlying the process of struggle in the air.

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The first factor is the condition of enemy air forces and air defense systems. For this reason special importance attaches to timely detection of the grouping of enemy air forces and air defense (both quantitatively and qualitatively), determining the directions of scientific research and experimental design work, the condition of defense industry, and possible variations in the course and nature of combat operations by enemy armed forces. Receiving this information, foreign specialists believe, makes it possible to have an idea, at each particular period of time, concerning the composition and location of enemy forces and the level and development of tactics of action and combat training programs and creates the essential prerequisites for development of the optimal tactical-technical requirements for new aircraft and correctly choosing the number and composition of personnel and equipment to insure superiority over the enemy. These data are the basis for compiling long-term forecasts in the area of weapons development and building military aviation and air defense.

The level of development of the domestic economy, industry, and technology and their potential for reorientation in some particular direction under concrete conditions is considered to be the second factor. The foreign press observes that the experience of past wars shows persuasively that superiority in the air can only be gained and held by relying on a powerful military industrial base that is able to replenish losses on time and provide the necessary superiority in forces over the enemy.

The third factor is skill in using available aircraft in combat. On this point foreign military experts emphasize that the struggle for air superiority must be waged purposefully and decisively, destroying not only the opposing air grouping but also aviation industry installations and other elements of the infrastructure that have a direct or indirect impact on replacement of losses and effective combat operations by enemy air forces and air defense. In their view, in the first mass strikes against the enemy aviation main forces should be concentrated against directly opposing air groupings and air defense, and only after they are wiped out or significantly weakened should aggressive actions against ground and naval forces be undertaken. The military leaders of Israel basically followed this conception in planning their aggression against the Arab states in 1967. They made the actions of ground forces directly dependent on the outcome of the struggle for air superiority. To be specific, according to their plans the primary strike groupings of forces operating on the Sinai front received the order to go over to the offensive 30 minutes after the Israeli Air Force delivered its first mass strike against Egyptian airfields and news concerning its great effectiveness had come in.

Two primary missions are accomplished by striking at air bases: enemy aircraft are wiped out on the ground (where surprise is achieved) and

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runways, ammunition dumps, POL's, and other airfield structures are knocked out. The former weakens the enemy aviation grouping, while the latter increases the density of enemy aviation basing and makes it more difficult to maneuver with personnel and equipment.

The foreign press emphasizes, however, that under contemporary conditions it is becoming increasingly difficult to suppress aviation at the airfield. There are a number of reasons for this, most importantly the increase in the range of detection of aircraft delivering a mass strike, especially when the air defense system includes the most effective new means such as DRLO planes and the E-3A sentry control unit (the AWACS system); improvement in the survival capability of aircraft on the ground thanks to the construction of special reinforced concrete and other shelters for the plane; fairly dense coverage of airfields by antiaircraft weapons; an increase in the combat readiness of aviation units and subunits. Under certain conditions this may bring about a situation where the losses suffered by the aircraft delivering the strike against the airfields surpass the results they achieve. This happened, for example, in the war of 1973 when the Israeli command decided to follow the practice used in their aggression of 1967 and suppress the main air forces of the Arab states at the airfields. But now the Arab air forces were spread around, planes were parked in strong concrete shelters, air fields had good antiaircraft missile and artillery cover, interceptor planes were in a high state of combat readiness, and the warning and control system assured timely detection of the attack and engagement of active air defense weapons. As a result, the Arab aviation loss from strikes against air fields was insignificant, while the Israeli Air Force suffered large losses.

In view of this bitter experience, some foreign military specialists even believe that air superiority can only be won by aerial battle. This is the view, in particular, of American Brigadier General W. Mitchell. He has said that air superiority is won in aerial battle and it cannot be won by any other means. Most other experts and representatives of the military leadership of the NATO countries consider this to be an extreme viewpoint, but to some extent it characterizes the enlarged role of aerial battle in the struggle for air superiority. With this in mind, a vigorous search is underway abroad for optimal tactical-technical specifications for the fighter plane of the future.

With due regard for combat conditions which may develop in the Central European theater, NATO has worked out the following requirements for this aircraft: (1) The new fighter must have a flying range of 3,500-4,000 kilometers without refueling in the air. This will give it an adequate tactical radius of action or allow it to remain in a patrol zone for the necessary time and then enter aerial combat. (2) The maximum speed of the plane should be at least as much as the maximum

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speed of enemy fighter planes. It must be combined with high maneuverability (in many cases the latter is the dominant parameter).

In addition, the fighter plane of the future must have powerful weapons that can destroy enemy aircraft at different ranges (from several tens of kilometers to tens of meters) and compensate for the speed and maneuverability shortcomings of the fighter; high reliability of electronic equipment, weapons, and all systems; good controllability in the full range of combat speeds and altitudes; an efficient, comfortable cockpit which will not fatigue the pilot quickly or limit his opportunity for visual detection of enemy aircraft and constant eye contact with them during close aerial battles; the possibility of waging combat operations from virtually unprepared airfields with small runways; low cost, so that there would be no objection to building a fairly large fighter aircraft grouping (foreign specialists calculate that the cost of the planes should be no more than two hundred dollars per kilogram) and others.

In general, foreign specialists believe building fighter planes capable of highly effective destruction of enemy planes in aerial battle and supplying them to the air force is one of the important conditions of achieving air superiority. In recent years, therefore, the commands of the U. S. and other NATO armed forces have been buying large batches of the latest fighters (for example the F-15A, Figure 1 [not reproduced], the F-16A, and the F-14A, (see Figure 2 [not reproduced]), equipped with up-to-date air-to-air guided missiles and devoting considerable attention to improving current combat vehicles and developing the next generation of them.

Suppressing and then wiping out the opposing group of ground air defense forces and means is a component part of the struggle for air superiority. The foreign press observes that with the current level of development of antiaircraft weapons and their broad use among the troops, air superiority cannot be considered won while the enemy has strong, unsuppressed air defense.

Even before the appearance of guided missiles the command of the U. S. Armed Forces, waging aggressive wars, was compelled to allocate significant air forces for the fight against antiaircraft artillery. In the concluding stage of the war in Korea, between 10 and 15 January 1953, aircraft of the 5th Air Army (primarily jet fighter bombers) flew 1,116 aircraft missions. About 60 percent of them were to suppress antiaircraft artillery, which had 135 antiaircraft guns.

During the period of U. S. aggression against Vietnam the American aircraft were opposed by a fairly powerful grouping of missile complexes and antiaircraft artillery. The Vietnamese air defense shot down more than 4,000 American planes, including about 1,000 supersonic tactical jet fighters and 77 strategic B-52 heavy bombers.

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The Israeli aggressors suffered significant aircraft losses from guided missile and antiaircraft artillery weapons during the wars they waged against the Arab countries.

In view of this, the United States and other capitalist countries have begun to develop new weapons systems designed to fight ground air defense weapons. The United States, for example, has developed the new Standard guided antiradar missile (ARM) and formed subunits of tactical F-105G fighters, which are specially adapted to suppress antiaircraft missile complexes and artillery. At the present time the U. S. Air Force is adopting new F-4G aircraft for this same purpose. Other steps are also being taken; in particular, more sophisticated means of radio-electronic warfare are being built and new tactical procedures are being developed.

American and other foreign military specialists believe that only combined use of the procedures, forces, and means of combatting enemy aviation and air defense can insure air superiority. At the same time, foreign military theoreticians admit the possibility that there will be new conceptions of how to win and hold air superiority. But they all agree that control of the air will continue in the future to be the prime combat mission because the effectiveness of performance of all other missions facing military aviation and the freedom of action of ground and naval forces depend on it, which means that the success of ground and naval operations depends on it.

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CRUISE MISSILES: SOVIET REVIEW OF U. S. MATERIEL

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[Article by Col-Engr V. Kirsanov: "Air-Based Cruise Missiles"]

[Excerpts] In line with the basic propositions of the strategy of "realistic deterrence," which pursues flagrantly aggressive goals, the military-political leadership of the United States tries to insure military superiority over the Soviet Union. To do this they modernize existing strategic offensive forces and develop lethal new weapons systems such as the Trident submarine atomic missile system, the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

Development of cruise missiles based in the air, at sea, and on land has gone forward at an accelerated pace in recent years and is in reality the beginning of a new round in the arms race which the U. S. military industrial complex is trying to make endless.

At the present time the United States is devoting most of its attention to building two types of air-based cruise missiles which are being developed on a competitive basis by the Boeing and General Dynamics companies.

Although development of the current generation of cruise missiles is not yet complete, the United States is already working on further refinements of them. They are studying the possibility of installing another correction system, which would improve the accuracy of the cruise missile, and radioelectronic warfare equipment. They are planning to increase the speed of the missile to supersonic and, finally, to put neutron warheads on the missiles. It is perfectly obvious that carrying out these proposals will require many millions in additional expenditures. American observer D. Middleton remarks, "The cost of cruise missiles, which at first appear to be a comparatively inexpensive weapon, is growing swiftly. Many experts believe that the cost of one missile may reach about 10 million dollars.

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At the present time the estimated cost of such a missile is 958,000 dollars without considering expenditures for scientific research and experimental design work."

The development of air-based cruise missiles in the United States not only fosters an intensification of the arms race; it also increases the danger that a nuclear war will be unleashed.

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